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Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) is a technology that protects against potential data 
breach incidents throughout different stages in information lifecycle in timely 
manner. DLP technologies can be employed in organizations where access to 
sensitive information is required by a relatively large number of end-users. It can 
play an important role in preventing unauthorized distribution of such information 
and mitigate insider threat. It will monitor information interchange operations and 
apply defined policies against suspicious incidents. However, DLP technologies 
suffer some showstoppers: (a) difficulties in accurately describing information to be 
monitored, (b) extended implementation time, and (c) limitations in handling 
encrypted and/or graphical information.  
DLP technologies can be improved by enhancing the monitoring activities so that 
less false positives and timely response are achieved. Improving DLP is a necessity 
for Oil & Gas industry because of the huge amount of sensitive information that is 
xiii 
 
regularly handled; otherwise, alerts raised by the DLP will be overlooked and lead 
to a false feeling of protection. In this research, we suggest a model to improve DLP 
in Oil & Gas companies by enhancing the identification of sensitive content and 
distributing the processing overhead over multiple stages. Our model will result in 
less number of false positive alerts, better use of the resources and less time to 
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 نموذج محسن لتقنية منع تسرب البيانات  :عنوان الرسالة
 
 علوم  الحاسب و المعلومات التخصص:
 
 2017ديسمبر  :تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
و المتعلقة   كشف الحوادث المحتملةتقنية حديثة من تقنيات الحماية االلكترونية و تهدف إلى نع تسرب البيانات هي م
و من ثم تطبيق سياسات الحماية بصورة تلقائية بغرض في الوقت المناسب، باختراق إعدادات الوصول إلى البيانات 
من أجل الحد الحؤول دون اكتمال عملية التسريب. منع تسرب البيانات تعتبر من االشياء المهمة في بيئات العمل و ذلك 
 .من التأثير السلبي على األعمال التجارية
بيانات في مختلف مراحل دورة حياة المعلومات وتطبيق سياسات للحد مراقبة ال )منع تسرب البيانات(تستطيع أنظمة 
 .من المخاطر المرتبطة بها
في المنظمات التي يحتاج فيها عدد كبير نسبيا من المستعملين النهائيين   تقنيات )منع تسرب البيانات(ويمكن استخدام 
ورا هاما في منع الكشف غير المصرح به عن الحساسة. ويمكن أن تلعب دذات الطبيعة  إلى الحصول على المعلومات
برصد عمليات تبادل   تقنيات )منع تسرب البيانات( . تقومالمنظمة من داخلالمحتملة هذه المعلومات وتخفيف التهديد 
 .المعلومات وتطبيق سياسات محددة ضد الحوادث المشبوهة
التي يمكن أن تقلل من الدور المطلوب منها في حماية المعيقات التقنية و تكنولوجيا منع تسرب البيانات تعاني من بعض 
المدة ( 2، )صعوبات في وصف المعلومات بدقة ليتم رصدها( 1) :البياناتز هذه الصعوبات يمكن أن تلخص في التالي
 .صورال التعامل مع المعلومات المشفرة و القيود في( 3، و )الزمنية الطويلة لتطبيق النظام
تكنولوجيا منع تسرب البيانات عن طريق تعزيز أنشطة الرصد وسياساته بحيث يتم تحقيق إيجابيات أقل ويمكن تحسين 
التي يحتاج هو ضرورة في البيئات  تقنيات )منع تسرب البيانات(تحسين  .كاذبة واالستجابة في الوقت المناسب
هن سسينتج عنه الكثير من الن الوضع الرا عامل مع كمية كبيرة من المعلومات الحساسة بانتظام.امستخدمين فيها للت




د في شركات النفط والغاز من خالل تعزيز تحدي )منع تسرب البيانات( تقنيات في هذا البحث، نقترح طرقا لتحسين
المنظمات جميع سيساعد تحقيق ذلك  أقل عدد من التنبيهات الكاذبة. ينتج عن ذلك  المحتوى الحساس في الرصد بحيث





1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world, data is the lifeblood of any organization. Typically, data is 
acquired, processed, stored and interchanged on daily basis at records rates [1]. 
Maintaining data confidentiality, integrity and availability is a fundamental business 
need and must be fulfilled to maintain business continuity and to avoid devastating 
damage. Modern information security measures [10] are implemented in multi-
layered models. Every layer contributes to the overall objective of safeguarding 
sensitive information within the organization. Figure [1] shows a typical 
implementation structure of information security measures within a given business 
domain: 
Designated DLP systems  
Scans data-in-motion, data-in-use and 
data-at-rest 
   
Access control & 
Encryption 
 
Device control, encryption, RMS 
   
intelligent security 
measures 
 Anomaly detection, activity-based routines, 
honey pots, 4th generation firewalls, etc 
   
Basic Security Measures  
Firewall, Antivirus, Intrusion detection 
system, thin client, policies, …etc. 
   
Framework  Regulation, Policies, Internal guidelines 
Figure 1: Structure of Information Security Layers. 
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Data Leakage Prevention is a relatively new technology. It is very useful in 
situations where access to sensitive data is always needed by end-users. Typically, 
Oil & Gas industry has this nature of data access. With the level of false-positives, 
complex configuration, and resources allocation of current Data Leakage Prevention 
(DLP) systems, organizations within Oil & Gas industry have one of two options: 
(1) Use technologies that are currently available and live with aforementioned high 
false-positive ratio and technical issues, and        (2) Overlook the technology and 
give away a great chance to protect against unauthorized distribution of the 
organization’s sensitive data. 
In Oil & Gas industries, information confidentiality is a top business priority [9]. 
The vast majority of actions related to exploration, drilling, reservoir management, 
and production of Oil & Gas resources are nothing more than producing intellectual 
properties. Leaking such values comes with huge reputation and financial burden 
on the business. Therefore, many solutions such as Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) 
are implemented on top of security models to mitigate this risk.  
DLP solutions can be classified into two main categories according to the way they 
detect sensitive content: rule-based or analysis-based. Rule-based DLPs [12] are 
discovering sensitive content using configured rules that define keywords, data-flow 
channels and other characteristics. Accordingly, the solution will assess the 
legitimacy of the data flow and trigger related action(s). Analysis-based DLPs use 
artificial intelligence or other analysis techniques to identify sensitive content and 
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create rules for near-matches. Rule-based DLPs suffer from high false-positives [14, 
18]. Therefore, it will not be a good solution for Oil & Gas industry since the nature 
of the business in this domain relies heavily on timely and complete interchange of 
sensitive data.   On the other hand, analysis-based DLPs, like text classifiers will 
provide an advantage over rule-based DLPs since majority of data within this 
domain is sensitive. As stated by [8], analysis techniques are also likely to fail in 
detecting documents, where most of the document is not confidential. This scenario 
is not applicable to Oil and Gas industries where the vast majority of interchanged 
data is technical report that are confidential by nature.  
Once an organization commits to deploy a DLP solution, data needs to be classified. 
DLP solutions provided by lead IT vendors rely on manual data classification while 
Oil and Gas business requires that data classification must be done automatically so 
that human errors and malicious intent can be eliminated [13].  
In this research, we argue that rule-based DLP solution can be improved drastically 
by devising a model that employs a comprehensive and structured analysis stage for 
the content before handling it by the used DLP solution. 
Our proposed model provides the ability to automatically identify and classify 
sensitive content without any manual tagging or preprocessing. The proposed DLP 
solution is suitable for Oil & Gas and uses (a) Domain-specific taxonomy to support 
identification of sensitive content, (b) Text classifier to classify documents based on 
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the taxonomy attributes, and (c) File labeler to update the file header with taxonomy 
values.  
The proposed model will improve DLP in the domain by reducing the number of 
false-positives. It will also improve performance by distributing the processing 
overhead of subject file over multiple stages. Our proposal includes a domain-
specific taxonomy that will provide a standard categorization scheme. The 
taxonomy will be used by classifier to generate meta-data for each file; later on the 
file labeler will use this metadata to tag files. The applied DLP solution will use 
updated file tags and file timestamp to decide on appropriate action. 
1.1 Thesis Objectives 
This research will focus on using text classifier and domain specific taxonomy to 
identify sensitive content in a standardized and consistent way. DLP system used in 
the organization can be easily configured and operated with minimal resources 
allocation to identify sensitive content and respond accordingly.  
The research aims to successfully reduce number of false-positives in files used in 
Oil & Gas domain and to reduce the time and resources needed to use DLP systems. 
The research will also propose domain-specific information taxonomy to replace 
human input as the reference in classifying sensitive content. Reducing human 
factor in the classification process should result in higher consistency and 
standardization in the discovery of sensitive content.  
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The research will use domain corpora to configure the used classifier, conduct the 
experiment and evaluate results.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The number of false-positives in DLP technology implementation within Oil & Gas 
industry domain is extremely high due inaccuracy in identifying sensitive content 
as well as the high demand on sensitive data by end users.   
This can be improved by devising a model that incorporates domain-specific 
taxonomy and machine learning algorithms to learn what is sensitive and classify 
files in a complete automatic manner.  
This model is expected to reduce the implementation time of DLP solution 
drastically and help organizations to improve the protection of sensitive information 
in the work domain. It will also avoid unnecessary delays and avoid hindering 
operations by monitoring data throughout the organization network. Accordingly, 
DLP solution can properly rank incident severity so that adequate mitigation can be 
applied to protect against information leakage. 
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
The proposed solution is expected to:  
• Provide improved accuracy in DLP systems 
• Reduce the time required to configure and maintain DLP technologies 
6 
 
• Introduce a new taxonomy for information within Oil & Gas industry 
We will examine the ratio of false-positive upon using the enhanced model for DLP 
and compare it to the ratio of false-positive of a standard DLP system. We assume 
that the ratio should be much less after using the enhanced model. 
In addition to that, we will discuss the requirement to implement the proposed model 
in comparison to the implementation of standard DLP system. We assume that 
implementation of the proposed model should be much less time and effort than 
standard DLP system. If both assumptions are found to be true, then we can 
conclude that devising DLP systems with automatic text classification and domain-
specific taxonomy for Oil & Gas industry will improve performance and reduce 
overhead. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 The thesis is organized into six Chapters. The first Chapter will provide an 
introduction about data protection challenges that different organizations face. In 
particular, the Chapter highlights this issue in Oil & Gas industry and relates the 
nature of business to the required contribution from DLP solutions. The Chapter 
also identifies major difficulties that might prevent organizations from reaping the 
fruit of DLP like the extended difficulties in accurately identifying information to 
be monitored and the lack of standardized way to configure and deploy standards 
DLP solutions. In the same Chapter, we state the research question and the method 
7 
 
to be used in order to resolve it using a combination of text-classification and 
domain-specific taxonomy. The Chapter ends with a brief of the expected results 
and contribution of the research and the method used to validate results. 
The second Chapter shows a literature review of Data Leakage Prevention 
technologies at three different dimensions. The first one we reviewed the scale of 
the problem and expected role from DLP system in the business. We also reviewed 
the different suggestions by other researchers to improve DLP systems. The Chapter 
also includes quick description of data protection solutions other than DLP systems. 
In the third Chapter we show in-depth discussion of DLP components, models, and 
architecture. In addition to that, it shows in details the different techniques used for 
content analysis in DLP solutions. We also used this Chapter to present information 
about the use of information in Oil & Gas industry. This information will provide 
necessary background to develop the proposed domain-specific taxonomy and its 
structure. 
In the fourth Chapter, we introduce our proposed model, its structure, and its 
functions. We provide detailed information about the different components in the 
model and their assigned tasks. We also provide detailed information about the 
proposed information taxonomy and its uses in the proposed model.  
In the fifth Chapter we provide information about the implemented prototype 
including the text classification model and the information taxonomy model. The 
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Chapter provides details about the used datasets and conducted experiment. Results 
of the experiment will also be provided in this Chapter to decide on the performance 
of the prototype.  
Chapter six concludes this thesis with a summary of the objectives, analysis, 
proposed model, performance evaluation and experiment results. We also envision 
areas open for improvement and envision future extensions.   
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2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
DLP is not researched highly in the academic community. The technology is still 
building up and there is a need for more researches and development. Recently, 
more researchers are looking for improvement in DLP technologies. Researches are 
expected to reflect positively on the role and the contribution of DLP in the 
protection against unauthorized distribution of sensitive data.  
In this Chapter, we will provide information about research work and technologies 
in three main areas: Scales of the problem, DLP researches, and non-DLP Data 
Protection solutions. 
2.1 Data Leakage Problem: Scale and Occurrence  
Unauthorized distribution of sensitive information within the enterprise network is 
emerging as an ongoing challenge to all organizations. Such distribution will result 
in an adverse impact on the organization business and reputation. It is the sole 
responsibility of the organization to properly handle confidential data under its 
custody. A shortcoming in this domain is a violation to the government regulations 
and might lead to business loss, government fines, and law suits.  
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Protecting against cyber-security threats and other data loss risk is a direct 
responsibility of the organization’s CEO and its board. Introducing proper internal 
controls is a compliance requirement. Criminal penalties for certain misconduct in 
this domain are enforced by the name of law.  
The financial impact of data loss has been studied by many researchers. According 
to Verizon [41] data breaches is steadily increasing on the last five years. One has 
suggested that addressing this issue the decade challenge for computer science. 
According to the Japan Network Security Association, sensitive data loss incidents 
in 2015 were 864 affecting more that 30 million people. The total damage is 
estimated to be more than 21 million US dollars [34]. These incidents are taking 
place in a regular basis as a result on intentional or unintentional actions. It has been 
reported that 66.2% of business users have sent emails erroneously [35]. Datalossdb, 
a nonprofit organization that documents known and reported data loss incidents 





Figure 2: Number of data breach Incidents by datalossdb organization. 
Clearinghouse, another nonprofit consumer organization, reported that 227,052,199 
sensitive records that reveal personal information were leaked during the period 
from 2005 to 2014.  
The very obvious example of the financial and reputational damage that happen to 
organization due to data leakage is the consequences of content published in 
WikiLeaks. Almost all information published there are classified and shared by 
insiders who made it through traditional protection measures. 
The global Information Systems Security report for year 2016-2017 showed that Oil 
& Gas industry is improving their understanding and preparation to protect against 
data leakage as part of cyber security. However the report stated that there is a need 
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Although [8] has argued that company reputation cost is overstated; [7] predicts that 
loss of reputation is one consequence of a data loss. Robert et al. had studied a 
limited sample that doesn’t represent the actual interest for people like social media 
network. His research didn’t cover critical sectors like banking, stocks, monetary 
firms or major manufacturer. His sample was limited to only two case studies in 
which one of them is a social network company.  
Different methods were suggested to estimate the cost of data leakage. Bunker 
suggested that loss can be divided into two categories: Direct loss: tangible damage 
can be measured like fines due to regulatory breach, clients  compensations, law 
suits, forensics cost, loss of man-hours, restoration cost. Indirect cost: stock share, 
reputation, loss of customers, loss of investment, loss of intellectual property and 
trade secrets.  
Unauthorized distribution of trade secrets and personal information within 
organization content can results in a serious damage to the organization. DLP can 
be used to protect against such consequences and maintain the organizations in 
control over their sensitive information. DLP protection covers: (a) Data in motion: 
identify and block unauthorized information transfer, (b) Data at rest: identify and 
proactively protect data in different repositories, and (c) Data in use: apply 
protection measure to protect against authorization abuse. 
Many DLP solutions are available in the market from major vendors in information 
security sector like Symantec, McAfee, RSA, and others. However, the expected 
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role of DLP systems is not yet properly addressed by current technology [30]. The 
main reason for that is the difficulty in identifying sensitive content. Comparative 
study to assess the relevancy of data leakage prevention mechanisms [30] revealed 
that DLP technologies need to improve mainly on the way sensitive data is detected 
and protected from unauthorized distribution. The researcher highlighted that DLP 
solutions need to improve on the semantic rather than syntax since structure of 
information might change from one document to another while same sensitivity is 
carried by two representations. There should be ways where a deployed DLP 
solution can identify “Information” instead of identifying the “Template”. 
2.2 Improving DLP Systems  
Data Leakage prevention is considered to be a new dimension in information 
protection and expected to protect against insider threats. DLP emerged as a result 
of repeated data leakage incidents and the regulatory compliance requirements. 
Researchers have looked at different areas of interest to improve DLP systems. In 
this section, we will provide a survey of researchers work. 
Many researchers have argued that DLP systems can be improved by focusing on 
the semantics and context rather than syntax and structure of monitored content. 
They also argued that results from DLP system are extremely impacted by data 
format and repositories. Preeti Raman et al. [30] for example concluded that suitable 
prevention techniques are defined by the repository in use. He also argued that DLP 
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systems need to consider the context in order to infer the semantics of 
communication. Other researchers have also emphasized on the importance of the 
semantics to improve DLP system when handling a given data leakage incident. 
Sandip et al. [39] emphasized on the semantics of the event in addition to data. In 
other words, he was highlighting the context in which data interchange event is 
taking place. He argued that lacking semantics is a common mistake in current DLP 
solutions. He suggested that future researches should addresses this area.  
Other researchers suggested different techniques to improve DLP systems. For 
example, Vachharajani et al. [31] suggested a labeling mechanism in which data 
will be assigned pre-defined tags to ensure that monitoring components will be able 
to capture suspicious incidents and triggers mapped policies. He did propose a 
method to perform this tagging mechanism. Some implementation of DLP systems 
requires that labeling will be performed by end-users which will open the door for 
high inaccuracy and malicious intent. Radwan et al. [40] suggested working on 
developing text classifiers and integrating encryption systems as a future work on 
Data Leakage Prevention systems. He argued that such work will solve the problems 
with current systems. 
Some researchers argued that DLP performance can be improved by matching the 
technology used in discovering sensitive content with the implementation 
environment. They classified DLP discovery technologies into rule-based and 
analysis-based [14, 18]. They argued that rule-based DLP systems suffer from high 
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false-positives; hence, analysis-based DLPs will provide better results. On the same 
direction, [8] stated that analysis-based DLPs are also likely to fail in detecting 
documents, where most of the document is not confidential. We could not find a 
research in the literature that suggests a combination of both techniques in order to 
complement each other and provide higher performance results.  
Other researches discussed that DLP systems can be improved by enhancing the 
processing overhead.  Given that DLP systems will handle huge amount of data, it 
becomes very necessary to balance processing needs in order to avoid 
latency/disruption to day to day activities [50]. Separating DLP activities between 
end-point and DLP gateway will help reduce performance overhead. 
Some work in the literature discussed methods that help investigation of leakage 
incidents. Several ways have been suggested to support effort that takes place after 
leakage is encountered.   
Some researchers suggested a method to gather Operating System files that help in 
investigating data leakage incidents. Lee et al. [32] provided guidance in files to be 
collected for windows based platforms.   
On the same direction, White et al. [39] proposed another method that helps 
identifying the leakage source by generating uniquely identifiable records that looks 
real so that forensics can identify the source of the leakage. 
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One cannot decide on the leakage incident without a comprehensive understanding 
of the domain. Author in [30] concluded that full knowledge of the context and the 
patterns in which data is used are necessary elements to imply if data leakage 
incident is taking place or not.  
Rohit Pol et al. [38] discussed the likelihood that an agent is responsible for a leak 
is assessed based on the overlap of his data with the leaked data. They presented an 
algorithm to implement a variety of data distribution strategies. 
Some researchers argued that DLP solution by itself cannot protect against data 
leakage. Tomoyoshi Takaebayashi et al. concluded that DLP should include three 
different yet integrated solutions like USB protection, email filtering, and secure 
document management solutions in order to properly address risk of data leakage at 
different data stages.   
Other researchers also emphasized on the subject of integrating DLP solutions with 
other information security measures. Ernst & Young’s Advisory Services [48] stated 
that effective protection of business sensitive data must be handled as a program 
rather than a solution to be deployed. The report identified data classification, user 
provisioning, regulatory framework, risk-assessment methodology, incident 
response measure as integral components to such a program. 
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2.3 Non DLP Data Protection Methods 
Researchers have identified different ways and methods for data protection other 
than DLP solutions. Most of these ways are focusing on protection against threat 
from outside the network like hackers or intruders.  
2.3.1 IDS / IPS  
The main objective of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is to monitor the traffic in 
the network and the activities in attached systems in order to identify cases where 
malicious activities are suspected. IDS come as hardware and in other 
implementation are built as a software component within other network devices. 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) performs almost same functionality as IPS. It 
monitors the traffic in the network and configured systems in order to identify 
malicious activities. In addition to that, IPS is designed to defuse suspicious 
activities and keeps information for future use. In that sense, we look at IPS as an 
extension to IDS.  
IDS/IPS typically includes hardware and software components that work together 
to complete the whole task. Usually following components are found in such 
systems: (a) Detectors: Capture data in the network and send it to the central system. 
(b) Central system: Receives captured data and apply necessary analysis. (c) 
Business intelligence and reporting: Generate reports based on applied analysis. (d) 
Database: Stores information needed for analysis and protection like source of 
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previous attacks, trend analysis, etc. (e) Response container: Collects and store 
information and form appropriate responses. 
 
Figure 3: IDS/IPS system based on Anomaly Detection. 
 
IDS / IPS follow two main techniques in monitoring traffic: (a) signature-based or 
matching (b) Heuristic or rules. Signature-based approach uses either pattern 
matching or packet classification to identify an occurrence of intrusion trial based 
on recorded attacks. A database is used to store information about viruses, worms, 
Trojans, and other malware to compare it with suspected intrusion trials. The next 
diagram shows typical components of Signature-Based systems [30]. Heuristic or 
rules based systems monitor the activities in the enterprise network in order to 
identify up-normal situations. 
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These systems are very efficient in identifying anomalies and known patterns; 
however, they are not as efficient in identifying isolated incidents of leaking 
sensitive data outside the network. 
2.3.2 Anti-Malware  
Malware is a malicious code/software that aims to cause damage in computer 
activities, steal sensitive information, modify or delete data values, etc.  There are 
many types of malwares like viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spywares, embedded 
malicious code, ransomware, rootkits, etc. 
Anti-malware is any software that recognizes and removes malware from computer 
devices. It also blocks installation of infected components (i.e. files, Trojans, etc.) 
in the computer. Anti-malware is an efficient protection tool and stand as a necessity 
to protect against threats from outside the network. It validates the inbound traffic 
using databases of known malwares to ensure that malicious content will not be 
allowed in. Anti-malware solution can protect two types of threats: Insider threat, 
zero-days attacks. They should be bundled with other protection technologies to 
improve the readiness of the network and narrow chances of successful attack. 
However, antimalware cannot protect against abuse of authorization. Data leaked 
through authorized accounts can go unnoticed by these protection solutions.  
2.3.3 Firewalls  
These are the basic defense mechanism to control the flow of network traffic to and 
outside the network. Firewalls are basically used to configure the set of accepted 
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access rules and to identify unauthorized access. Firewalls technology has evolved 
into Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) that combines other functionality with 
access control. Currently, NGFW comes bundled all together with Intrusion 
Prevention, Deep Packet Inspection, and Anti-malware capabilities [27]. 
Firewalls can protect against viruses, worms, malware, and Trojan horses. Without 
a firewall, the network becomes open for attacks from outside which might result in 
loosing sensitive data in different repositories within the network. However, data 
leakage that is originated from within the network can not benefit a lot from these 
capabilities. It is necessary to integrate firewalls with other information security to 
protect against such risk.  
2.3.4 Others 
There are many other solutions to improve protection of sensitive data. The number 
and type of solution has exponentially increased as a result of the expansion in 
Information and the need for protection solution. Multiple layers in the information 
security framework as shown in Figure 4 can be used to enhance the protection of 




Figure 4: Information Security sub-domains. 
 
Data protection can be achieved by other tools that address one or more protection 
dimension. An example is the use of Google Alert as a replacement for the 
Discovery function of DLP systems. Google Alert can monitor web servers and 
automatically notify concerned organization about availability of sensitive data in a 
certain domain so that protection measures can be applied.  
Some Web Security and Email protection solutions includes data leakage as part of 
their functionality. Webense WebGate Security has developed PortAuthority 
solution to include some leakage prevention capabilities.  
Other web blocking solutions like HTTP/HTTPS blockers, SMTP blocking - FTP 
prevention server can be used to protect data by controlling the ability to transfer 
content and/or files to servers outside the network.  
Deployed solutions in each sub-domain including DLP systems can be configured 
in Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) system in order to provide 
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data and analyze it. The goal of this integration is to highlight vulnerabilities and 
help getting a centric visibility to the possible threats on the network [33].  
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3 CHAPTER 3 
DLP Systems and Research Domain 
Data Leakage Prevention systems includes several components that work together 
to complete the intended actions. It is important to have solid background about all 
of these components, their functions, and their architecture in order to propose new 
model. It is also important to understand the techniques used in identifying sensitive 
content in today’s Data Leakage Prevention systems so that we can compare it and 
maintain the capabilities in the proposed mode. 
It is also in the same importance to have a solid background about the use of 
information within Oil & Gas industry. As a targeted domain by our research, we 
should have clear idea about data capturing, data flows, and data storage activities. 
We also need to have good idea about business functions and the expected data 
consumption at different stages so that we can estimate the importance and the 
criticality of devising a reliable solution in such a domain. 
In the following sections, we will discuss the components and the working model 
of Data Leakage Prevention systems. We will also discuss in details the content 
analysis methods used to identify sensitive content. Our discussion will provide the 
required background about strengths and weaknesses of each method so that we can 
proceed to propose the suggested model. We will also discuss the use of information 
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in Oil & Gas domain showing their nature and the common activities related to this 
issue. 
3.1 Analysis of DLP Technology 
DLP system has different components that work together and integrate each other. 
They are built and implemented on the enterprise network in a way that facilitates 
the required function. DLP solutions use different techniques to complete content 
analysis as part of the overall function. In the following section we will discuss the 
structure, function, and techniques used in DLP systems.  
3.1.1 DLP Components  
DLP has two main broad components. Together, they enable monitoring and 
preventing of unauthorized distribution of sensitive information. These components 
are: (a) Data Monitoring Components and (b) DLP policies components.  
Data Monitoring Components handle the capture, rebuild, and analysis of 
transferred files. The techniques to complete this task are dependent on the file type, 
file format and file location. Together, they got the file collected, rebuilt, and passed 
to the “Content Analysis” part in order to decide whether an existing policy can be 
associated with it or not. Content analysis is the main component in DLP systems. 
It evaluates the content and specifies the correct policy to trigger. We will discuss 
content analysis in more details in the following pages.   
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DLP Policies components contain information about: (a) Repositories: define the 
location where data to be protected is stored. (b) Rules: defines when and how to 
protect content. Two things are taken into account while working with repositories 
and rules: 1) the conditions to be matched. For example, look for content with Oil 
well number and production volume, and 2) the action to be applies: Automatic 
response when the condition is matched, for example, takes a log and report the 
event to some recipients 
3.1.2 DLP systems Architecture 
DLP is a multi-layered solution. Once the first layer of protection is implemented, 
the next layer should/could be addressed. There are many different forms of DLP 
applications architecture depending on the location of the sensitive data and the 
transfer method. A typical DLP system architecture is shown in Figure (5) 
 
Figure 5: DLP System Overall Architecture. 
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Data Monitoring and Analysis tools usually architecture in a way that facilitates 
capturing of data. Typically, they either exist at data repository site (i.e. end-points) 
or as a separate appliance to intercept data transferred over the network. DLP 
Policies components usually exist in the central management site. They facilitate 
centralized responses/actions to different sensitive data transfer scenarios.  
Data at source and data at rest are two different statuses in which data resides in 
end-use computer or other storage station (i.e. file server, NAS, etc.). DLP systems 
can handle data in this status and trigger actions like blocking movement of data or 
generate an alert. Data in motion is the third status in which DLP can deal with data, 
typically, DLP systems can block or allow the transfer.  
Data that is stored in different repositories will be accessed and scanned by DLP 
system in order to identify if a sensitive content is available or not. Accessing these 
files require network administrator to define two things: (a) Administrative 
connection for DLP agents in order to traverse through the network and reach for 
files. (b) Central DLP policy/ scanning server.  
This architecture will carry high-traffic in the network thus; enough resources are 
needed to perform real-time analysis and scanning. The other option is to complete 
the scan after peak-hours which open the window for leaking data during working 
hours (the actual time where leakage might happen). Another way to work with files 
that resides in different repositories is deploying a server agent module in the 
repository. This way is used in situations where huge amount of data is stored in 
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one repository such as database servers and file servers. The agent will perform 
required scanning and send results and findings to the central DLP server. Network 
and database administrators will be required to monitor the impact of these agents 
on these servers. Another architecture of DLP systems is to integrate with other 
solutions that manage documents such Documentum (enterprise content 
management platform), FileNet (software to help enterprises manage their content 
and business processes). Integration is needed in these situations in order to 
perform all discovery and analysis tasks.  
An agent will be installed in the server side and configured in a way that it can 
reference storage attributes, and documents attributes in a step to perform the 
scanning and analysis tasks. Configuration of such agents requires multiple tests and 
usually requires second line support in order to match changes on the targeted 
solutions. 
3.1.3 Content Analysis in DLP Systems  
Content Analysis is actually a collection of techniques used to understand the 
monitored information. It can be divided into two broad areas: (a) Described data: 
Specifying how to identify a piece of information like “Well Information”, 
“Reservoir Information”, “Production Information”, etc. and how it looks like (b) 




Content analysis in DLP systems sometimes is referred to as Deep Content 
Inspection (DCI). It is considered as the evolution of Deep Packet Inspection and 
adds to the picture the ability to examine the whole file and its content rather than 
individual packets. DCI allows for a content-aware inspection. It rebuilds the file 
and look for matches as defined in DLP policies. Figure 6 shows the architecture of 
Deep Content Inspection (DCI) [35].  
 
Figure 6: Architecture of Deep Content Inspection. 
DCI is built using two main components: (1) Content Capturing & Collector (2) 
Content Analysis Engine. 
Content Capturing & Collector parses textual data of a source file to pass into the 
content analysis engine. The analysis engines need to work with text, and many of 
the file and data formats such as Office documents or PDF files are binary data. The 
“Content Capture” takes a file, determines the format, then uses a parser to extract 
all the text.  
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Some tools can support hundreds of file types, including complex situations like 
documents embedded in other documents. It's the job of the collector to assemble 
the file and pass it for analysis 
Once the file is opened up, the content analysis engine evaluates the text and looks 
for policy matches. On occasion, the tools will look for a binary, as opposed to a 
textual match, for data like audio and video files, but the textual analysis is where 
the real challenge is. Several techniques are used for this purpose like rules/regular 
expressions that uses textual analysis to find matching patterns, such as the structure 
of a credit card or Social Security number. Some of these rules and regular 
expressions can be quite complex to minimize false-positives. Another technique is 
database fingerprinting (exact data matching) pulls data from a database and looks 
only for matches of specified data. Thus, it is loaded with hash values. Partial 
document matching is another techniques that takes a source file, parses out the text 
and then looks for subsets of that text. It usually creates a series of overlapping 
hashes that allow capabilities like identify a single paragraph cut out of a protected 
document and pasted into a Web mail session. The latest used technique is the 
statistical analysis. It uses machine learning or other techniques to analyze a set of 
known "protected" data and known "clean" data to create rules for near-matches.  
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3.2 Information in Oil & Gas Industry 
Oil and Gas play a very important role in the world’s economy. The industrial nature 
of today’s life places an increasing demand on hydrocarbon resources. In the early 
twentieth century, hydrocarbon resources became the most valuable commodity 
traded in the world markets [11]. The industry has three main sub-domains: (a) 
Upstream, (b) Midstream, and (c) Downstream. This research focuses on the first 
domain, the Upstream as it represents the most critical part in the industry and 
involves the most sensitive information.   
3.2.1 Main Upstream Functions  
Upstream domain includes three distinctive yet interdependent phases namely: 
Exploration, Development, and Production.  
In Exploration phase, geologists and geophysicists work together in a quest to search 
for potential underground hydrocarbons. They collect information through seismic 
test, core samples and Drill Stem Test to identify rock properties (i.e. porosity, 
permeability), formation structure, flow rate, pressure, temperature and other data 
to characterize and model the reservoir [2].   
In Development phase, petroleum engineers will work to manage the identified 
reservoir in a way that achieves the highest economic recovery. They accurately 
assess the reserves, recommend cost effective way to develop the field (i.e. well 
drilling and workover), production, and reservoir depletion. They use data from 
31 
 
geological models (Reservoir Description & simulation), production, pressure, 
temperature surveys to complete the field optimization task [2].   
In Production phase, production engineers will monitor developed fields and 
perform surveys used in reservoir analysis [2]. In addition to that, engineers 
contribute to other functions that fall under different phases. For example, 
production engineers will participate in data acquisition data acquisition for the use 
of functions under Exploration and/or Development phases.   
3.2.2 Data in Upstream Functions 
There is a huge increase in data types and volumes within Oil & gas industry. All 
companies are facing difficulties in managing this ever-increasing data. Main 
challenges laying on identifying and implementing best techniques in order to store, 
quality check, retrieve, and protecting this data. Such difficulties have resulted in 
unnecessary delays in completing related business tasks. Specialists will spend 
longer times to get required information, and prepare it for their use. On the other 
hand, Management are frustrated due to extended cycle times. On the other hand, 
concerns related to uncontrolled access to data and data leakage is constantly 
increasing. The need to maintain the organization's knowledge and to introduce and 
maintain rigorous audit trail is also constantly increasing. In brief, Information 
management is becoming a problem for everyone. In many instances, these factors 
limit the organization capacity and result in increased expenditure. An effective way 
of managing information is having it categorized into functional and operational 
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categories. Knowing the nature of the information and its use in the business along 
with other identifying attributes will enable better management and better security.  
For instance, if information is classified as confidential information that is 
applicable in certain business function, then there will be no worry about having this 
information interchanged over multiple steps or different processes within that 
function. Alerts should be raised when that information is handled by non-related 
process. 
In Oil & Gas Industry, data is typically generated in one business function and 
handed to the next function to continue the value-chain. Identifying the business 
function that generated data and the destination or possible uses of this data is very 
important to deem the legitimacy of any data access activity. In addition to that, it 
is of the same significant to identify other factors related the data 
format/representation and the sensitivity attribute. A typical flow of data through 
different business functions within Oil & Gas domain is shown in Figure 7.  
Sensitivity of information is directly related to the phase of generating and 
consuming data. For instance, data related to new explorations and field 
development is of a very high sensitivity. Information related to production volumes 
are of the same sensitivity.  
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Based on this notion, we suggest that information taxonomy for Oil and Gas is very 
important. It will be used to identify the sensitivity of a given content taking into 
account the domain-specific input (i.e. business function).  
There are limited trials to build such taxonomy however, we are not aware of any 
completed effort that can be used for protecting sensitive data. Available 
taxonomies are considering either a high level classification drivers or absolute 
business functions. The useful taxonomy should provide all attribute needed for the 
goal of protecting the data. Hence, we need to develop a taxonomy that serves the 
research purpose and provide a step in standardizing information management 




Figure 7: Information flow in Oil & Gas Processes [52]. 
The taxonomy will also be useful for other data management activities like quality 
assurance, knowledge management, and data analysis. It should provide the ability 
to store information related to these activities as well as information security 
activities. Studying different business functions and data generated / used in each 
function will help develop this taxonomy. Sample of different business function and 
data types (i.e. names) used in each function is shown in Table 1. The table shows 
















Seismic surveys & Acquisition 
Seismic processing  
Seismic interpretation  
Seismic acquisition crew morning 
reporting  
Seismic borehole activities  
Core Data 
Conventional core analysis 




Open hole logs  
Cased hole logs 






Gravity and magnetic surveys  


















PVT data  
Formation testing and sampling 
(FTS) 
Reservoir pressure (SIBHP, PTA)  





Crude sample analysis  
ESP performance  
Flowmeter survey 
Gas injection  
Gas sample analysis  
Gas well monitoring 
Inhibitor jobs  
Oil production  
 
Table 1: Sample of the data used in Oil & Gas industry. 
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The need to identify metadata necessary to enable better data management and 
improved security is mostly overlooked by generic Data Protection tools and has 
not been clearly stated in most of the previous implementations. In order to include 
this metadata in the proposed Data Leakage Protection model, it is needed to 
establish a standard way for classification.  For this reason, we suggest that 





ENHANCED DLP PROPOSED MODEL 
We suggest that a better solution can be achieved by reducing the ratio of false-
positives and balancing the processing overhead. We introduced a model that works 
in the following logic: 
1- A module will use Support Vector Machine (SVM) model to classify the files 
and update the file metadata based on the used information taxonomy. The 
updated metadata of files will be used later on for different purposes including 
security related goals.  
2- The DLP solution will use the file metadata to identify sensitive content for data-
in-motion and trigger the designated counter measure as defined in the solution 
policies. 
The proposed model is structured in a way that enables DLP solution to perform 
required tasks with the minimum overhead while keeping other components 
perform in updated and synchronized manner. Files to be classified exist in end-
users storage media, file servers, or other file repositories such as Documentum, 
FileNet, etc. each repository will subscribe to the service by registering 
identification information of the device and ensure that information taxonomy is up 
to date.  
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The proposed model scans files in the repository to identify obsolete timestamp. 
These files are classified using an SVM-based text classifier module and results will 
be provided to the “File Labeler” module. On the next step, the labeler updates the 
timestamp and the file label with identified values for each attribute in the used 
taxonomy based on results from the classifier. 
Data-at-motion is examined by the deployed DLP solution (Rule-based) to identify 
files with specific labels. The DLP solution triggers adequate actions/policies 
accordingly.  
The proposed model includes the following components:  
• Information Taxonomy: Acts as a knowledgebase to provide details 
necessary to complete the classification of files within Oil & Gas domain.  
• File Checker: Ensures that stored files are classified  
• Text Classifier: Uses information stored in the taxonomy to classify and 
generate attributes values for stored files.  
• File Labeler: Updates file with a label that reflects the identified attributes 
values.  





Figure 8: Block Diagram of the Proposed Model. 
 
4.1 Functional Architecture 
The different components will interact with each other to perform one task that is 
reducing the false-positives by having files classified and prepared in accurate, 
standardized and consistent manner. This will require files to do exist in physical 
repositories where other system components will access and classify them. 
Communication components will use the network to retrieve files and taxonomy 
information from their repositories.  Retrieved information will be passed to other 





Figure 9: Functional Architecture of the proposed model. 
 
The main components in the system are the Text Classifier and The File Labeler. 
The text classifier will get files in the queue and perform classification based on 
attributes defined in the local copy of the taxonomy. Identified attributes values will 
be used by the File Labeler to tag the file. The File Labeler will also update the 
timestamp to ensure that files have been classified after last change. These functions 
are working with each other as described in the Figure 9.  
4.2 Operational Architecture 
As stated by [14], an operational architecture consists of a set of software 
components, a set of flows between the components, and a set of constraints on the 




Figure 10: Operational Architecture of the proposed model. 
 
The proposed model operates on files that exist in “File Repository”. On cyclic 
checks, the “File Checker” will evaluate stored files to decide if classification is 
needed or not. File to be classified will be placed in a To-Do queue so that “Text 
Classifier” will handle them in ordered manner.  Classification results will be sent 
to the “File Labeler” along with file information. The “File Labeler” will update 
metadata of each file with results received from the “Text Classifier” and write the 
file back to its original storage location.  
When files are sent outside the network domain, they will be intercepted by the 
“Corporate DLP”. Files will be received with clear, standardized, and consistent 
labels that enable for accurate (low false-positive ratio) actions to be executed.   
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4.3 Proposed model components 
The proposed model has several components that interact with each other and with 
other systems to complete aimed enhancement. Following is a description of each 
component: 
4.3.1 File Checker 
The File Checker (FC) will scan files that exist on the designated repositories (R). 
It will look for the file classification-timestamp (fcts) in each file and compare it 
with the file last change timestamp (fLTS). Files with (fcts) < (fLTS) in (R) are the 
candidates for the Text Classifier. These files will be locked by the (FC) and placed 
in the Unclassified Files List (UFL).  
File Identification for classification 
(1) ; ; Scans files from designated repository (R)  
(2) ; ; Add Unclassified files to UFL 
(3) For each file f ϵ R 
(4) Get fcts 
(5) Get fLTS 
(6) If  ( fcts <  fLTS)  then 
(7) Lock (f) 
(8) UFL = UFL U  f 
Figure 11: File identification algorithm. 
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The File Checker performs the scan for text classification candidate files in pre-
defined Check-Cycles (CC).  The cycle interval can be configured in a way that 
doesn’t overload the system or adversely impact the performance.  The algorithm 
shown in Figure 11 describes the operation executed by the File Checker (FC) in 
order to identify candidate files for classification.  
4.3.2 Oil & Gas Information Taxonomy 
Oil & Gas companies are facing challenges in managing the ever-increasing data in 
the domain. Main challenges laying on identifying and implementing best 
techniques in order to store, quality check, retrieve, and protecting this data 
We suggest that information taxonomy for Oil and Gas domain will improve the 
performance of data security. It will help identifying the sensitivity of different data 
types in a standardized and consistent way.  
The proposed taxonomy includes several attributes that define the source, uses, 
responsibility, and sensitivity of information used in Oil & Gas industry. For every 
data set, the taxonomy value will be identified in a way that takes into account the 
value of each attribute of that data set. The identified value will be used to determine 
how to handle different aspects of data management activities including data 





(1) Geographical attributes:  
This attributes define the exact geographical location to which data is related. 
Examples: Eastern Oil Fields, African Oil fields, Central Asian Oil 
Fields…etc. Geographical locations are usually organized in structural hierarchy 
that consists of one or multiple locations. For instance, African Oil Field may 
include subordinate of the following values: Nigerian fields, Angola Fields, etc. and 
the Arabia Gulf Fields may include the following subordinates: Saudi fields, Kuwait 
fields, Oman fields, etc.  
The geographical attribute is designed in a way similar to the scheme used by Oil & 
Gas companies in segregating their operations. Usually, a level of classification is 
set for the main region (i.e. content) then the region in which hydrocarbon reservoirs 
might expand over multiple geopolitical locations (i.e. Arabian Gulf, Central Asia, 
etc.). The last level of classification is the Oil/Gas Field. The structure diagram for 





Figure 12: Taxonomy Geographical Attribute. 
 
(2) Organizational attributes:  
This attribute defines the organizational entity within the enterprise that generated 
this data. Usually, such organization is the main beneficial of this data and the most 
concerned with its quality and security. This attribute will be used to decide on the 
legitimacy of accessing and handling such data sets. For instance, if an attribute with 
a value that sets entity “A” as the organizational attribute, then all users within this 
attribute are candidate for legitimate use unless further restrictions are introduced. 
The attribute is of significant importance to protect sensitive content as it will reflect 
suspicious access/handle of related data sets. 
The attribute can be defined by linking the value of the attribute to the complete list 

































Attribute value Organizational entity name 
0-0-0 Top management 
1-0-0 Drilling 
1-0-2 Drilling Engineering 
1-0-3 Coring & Fishing 
1-1-0 Workover 
1-1-1 Workover Engineering 
1-1-2 Workover Planning 
3-1-0 Exploration Well Appraisal 
Table 2: Sample of the Organizational Attributes. 
 
 (3) Functional attributes:  
These attributes define the main Oil & Gas function related to this dataset in Oil & 
Gas business. Such information will help to improve the quality of the data and to 
define security measures and legitimacy of its use.  
The functional attribute will position the dataset under “Main Function”, “Sub 
function”, and “Activity”.  For instance, if a given “Well Test” technical report is 
classified using this taxonomy, the value of the functional attribute for this file will 
be 5-6-4 as 5 represent the main function: “Reservoir description and dynamics”, 6 
represents the sub function: ”Formation evaluation and management“,  and 4 
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represents the activity: “Drillstem or well testing”. Simple examples of main 






110 Reservoir Information Production Surveys   
1202  Seismic and logs  
130  Flow meters readings  











310 Geologic modeling Profiles  
320  Processing  
330  Modeling  
Table 3: Sample of the business functions. 
  
(4) Sensitivity Attributes:  
This attribute will define the level of confidentiality of the dataset. It will vary from 
1 to 4 having 4 as the very high sensitive data and 1 is the non-sensitive data.  
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The definition of accepted values for each attribute is to be configured by the 
security framework within the Oil & Gas domain. For instance, the Geographical 
attribute will be configured to make room for all locations where the business is 
operating and the sensitivity attribute can be modified to indicate more or less 
security related sensitivity severity. Sample implementation of the taxonomy for a 
given file and its attributes is shown in Figure (13).   
 
Figure 13: File classified using Oil & Gas information taxonomy. 
4.3.3 Text Classifier 
Unclassified file (UF) placed in the Unclassified Files List (UFL) will be handled 
by the Text Classifier (TC) in order to classify the file according to attributes that 
are defined in the local copy of the Taxonomy (LT). Each Unclassified File (UF) 
will be given certain value for all attributes. Valid values for each attribute will be 
fetched from the local copy of the “Taxonomy” (LT) so that classification is up to 
date. Upon completing the classification task, the Text Classifier will pass the file 
(UF) along with generated values (LTV1 … LTV4) to the “Classified File List” 
(CFL) in order for the “File Labeler” (FL) to tag the file. The Text Classifier will 
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repeat this operation until the “Unclassified File List” is empty. The algorithm 
shown in Figure 14 describes the operation carried by the “Text Classifier”  
File attributes generation 
(1) ; ; Gets files from UFL  
(2) ; ; Add files to CFL 
(3) While UFL ≠ {  }  
(4) Get file f 
(5) For Ɐ LTVi 
(6) Generate fLTVi 
(7) CFL = CFL U f 
(8) UFL = UFL – f 
Figure 14: File attributes generation algorithm. 
 
Our proposed model will identify the value of each taxonomy attribute for the file 
in hand. In specific, the classifier will identify the following: (a) Geographical 
location (b) Organization: top management, drilling, exploration, reservoir 
management, etc. (c) Function: Reservoir Information, description and dynamics, 
Geological model, etc., and (d) Sensitivity attribute: The confidentiality level of the 
content.  
Attributed files will be handed over to the File Labeler with a value for each attribute 
as shown in the figure (15). 
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The first component in the Text Classifier is the “Content Extractor”. The main 
function for this component is the extract or converts the content of handled files to 
text so that it can be handled by the classifier. The component is using programmatic 
modules according to the file type.  
 
Figure 15: Output of the model’s classifier. 
 
Multiple classification cycles are needed to complete full-classification for each file. 
As shown in Figure (16), separate classification steps are included in the proposed 
model for this purpose. The Geographical classifier sub-module will identify the 
Geographical location; the organization classifier sub-module will identify the file 
organization and so on. At the end, the file will be sent to the “Classified File List” 




Figure 16: Operations and maintenance of the classifier. 
 
Text Classifiers should be updated all the time to ensure that generated values are 
reflecting changes on the central taxonomy attributes in a timely manner. This goal 
is achieved by means of keeping the Text Classifier synchronized with the central 
taxonomy. Classifier-Synchronizer component will maintain this objective.    
The Classifier-Synchronizer CS will compare Timestamp of the Local Copy of the 
Taxonomy (LT) to check if any changes have been introduced since the last 
configuration of the Text Classifier (TC). If yes, then CS will perform new 
configuration cycle on the TC in the following logic:  
• Read the new values of the taxonomy. 
• Update the classifier configuration files (i.e. features, instances, training 
set, testing set, etc.)  
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• Train and Test Classifier sub-module(s).  
• Regenerate new version of the TC 
If changes are introduced to the Local copy of the Taxonomy (LT), then training 
and testing datasets might need to be updated as well. New datasets should be 
supplied by the Global Taxonomy and used by the Taxonomy-Synchronizer to 
update classifiers configuration files and train them.  
The supplied training sets will be used by the classifier to change content into 
vectors with values of the class that could be any values of the taxonomy attribute. 
For example, if new geographical location is included, the global taxonomy will be 
updated and new training set with documents that represent positive and negative 
examples will be supplied to the synchronizer. The TS will use these documents 
along with the new taxonomy value to train the relevant classifier(s) so that 
documents related to that new geographical location will be automatically 
discovered. 
4.3.4 File Labeler 
The File Labeler will receive Classified Files (CF) in Classified Files List (CFL). 
Received files are not tagged (UTF). File Labeler will tag the file with a label that 
reflects the most recent value for each attribute according to identification done by 
the Text Classifier. Tagged File (TF) will be written back to its original storage area 
in (R). Finally, the File Labeler (FL) will update the Classification Timestamp (CT) 
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and unlock the file.   The algorithm shown in Figure 17 describes the operation 
executed by the File Labeler: 
File Labeling and unlocking 
(1) ; ; Gets files from CFL  
(2) ; ; Add files to R 
(3) While CFL ≠ {  }  
(4) Get file f 
(5) For Ɐ LTVi 
(6) Label f =  LTVi  
(7) Update fcts 
(8) Write f  R 
(9) Unlock f 
(10) CFL = CFL -f 
Figure 17: File labeling steps. 
 
Central taxonomy: ch3anges in the taxonomy attributes and/or values are done on 
the central taxonomy and synchronized with local copies using push/pull methods. 
The centralized taxonomy will enable timely changes as required by the business 
without invalidating the local copies that are used in classifying files in different 
repositories.  
4.3.5 Corporate DLP 
The used DLP solution can use a Rule-based method to identify files with sensitive 
content. Each file that includes “Sensitive Content” Label will be easily identified 
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by the DLP solution. Appropriate mitigation policy will fire to ensure that 
unauthorized transaction will not take place.  
The fact that all labels are automatically generated with minimum human interaction 
will ensure that classification is completed in the most accurate, standardized, and 
consistent manner. All files will undergo same classification according to the 
defined attributes in the taxonomy.  
Files with no labels and/or CT < LCT will be rejected by the DLP solution and send 
back to the File Checker with Priority = high. This will make the file makes its way 
to the Unclassified File List (UFL) directly and got classified at the next cycle.  
Files with CT > LCT and sensitivity level that matches one of the defined policies 








MODEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We implemented a prototype as a proof of concept to evaluate the effectiveness of 
our proposed model. The prototype used SVM text classifier and two datasets for 
configuration (i.e. Training and Testing) and one dataset for evaluation. Results of 
the prototype evaluation experiment is collected and compared to the results of a 
standard DLP system in-use. The differences between our prototype results and the 
standard DLP system results mark the scale of the improvement as suggested by our 
proposed model. 
In the following pages, we will discuss the prototype implementation and the used 
datasets. We will also explain the configuration of the text classifier and the 
conducted experiment. We will also show the results of the experiment and the 
changes in false-positive ration in both scenarios. 
5.1  Evaluation Methodology  
Since our proposed model has the standard DLP and additional enhancement 
components, we evaluated our proposal in two different yet integrated areas: (a) the 
accuracy of the classifier (b) The false-positive ratio of the model. As shown in 
Figure18, we used two datasets to perform the evaluation. Dataset (1) is used to 
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evaluate the performance of the classifier and dataset (2) to evaluate the false-
positives ratio of the model. Both datasets are explained in details in section 5.2. 
 
Figure 18: Classifier & Model Evaluation. 
The classifier is the major component in the proposed model. It should be 
configured in a way that provides high accuracy. In order to ensure this requirement, 
we evaluated the performance of the classifier using testing data within dataset (1). 
The defined the accuracy as the percentage of the correct classification in these 
testing files. The evaluation and its results is explained in detail in section 5.3 
The model integrates other components with the text classifier. Namely: (a) 
Information Taxonomy: provides the knowledgebase to be used by the text 
classifier. (b) File Checker: to identify files that are due for classification, (c) File 




We evaluated the performance of the model using dataset (2). This dataset is used 
as input to the proposed model and result (R2) is recorded. We compared the correct 
percentage in (R2) to the percentage of correctness in (R1). The evaluation and its 
results are explained in section 5.4. 
Datasets that are used in the evaluation were carefully selected to give good 
representation of the population. We performed checks on data files types and sizes 
to measure the similarity of the datasets with files used in Oil & Gas industry. We 
provided information about datasets and their content in section 5.2.  
5.2 Used Data Sets 
We used two datasets in our research as described below: 
1- Dataset (1): Total of 2000 files from Oil & Gas domain that we used to 
train and test our classifiers. 
2- Dataset (2): Total of 483 files that were identified as sensitive files by DLP 
(Rule-based) system in use. 
Below is more description about each dataset:  
Dataset (1): We collected two thousand documents in English. The collected files 
represent different files types that are commonly used in Oil & Gas industry. 
Selected files have different sizes and different formats. Sizes of files vary from 1kb 
to several MBs. Table 4 shows the percentage of used file formats in our corpora. 
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Files formats in the corpora included mostly files in PDF format in addition to other 
common files formats like MS word, MS PowerPoint and MS outlook messages 
files. These specified file formats represent the vast majority of reports 
representation in the domain. We checked three file repositories in different sub-
domains within Oil & Gas organizations and found that file types in corpora 









Represented in the 
selected files types 
281,344 124,992 624,321 1,030,657 95.4% 
Not represented in 
the selected files 
types 
6,946 13,701 26,584 47,231 4.6% 
Table 4: File types representation in the used corpora. 
This finding shown in Figure 19 reflects that selected files in the corpora are a good 
representation for files used in Oil & Gas domain.  Therefore, it will provide good 
sample for the classifier configuration performance evaluation.  
 










Most of the files in the corpora are PDF files since it is the main format used in 
generating and distributing final reports. Figure 20 shows that PDF files represent 
the highest number of selected files. Work in progress files are drafted in MS word 
files and converted to PDF after been approved and signed by the function owner. 
# File Type Number of copies 
1 PDF files 1000 
2 Outlook messages 500 
3 MS PowerPoint  300 
4 MS Word files 200 
 Total 2000 
Table 5: File formats in the used corpora. 
 
Selected files did not include encrypted or image files as these files will not be 
covered by our proposed model. Image files can be handled by means of generating 
a signature for the file. However, this technique has some drawbacks as minor 
changes in the file will change the signature value and makes DLP system unable 




Figure 20: File formats in the used corpora. 
 
Files sizes are in general similar to used files sizes. More than 90% of files (1828 
files) in the corpora are less than 2 MB while the rest (172 files) are relatively large 
files. Figure 21 shows that common files sizes represent the majority in the corpora.  
 
Figure 21: Sizes of files in the dataset. 
The files in our corpora are organized into different sensitivity levels according to 





















follow specific features and criteria in order to specify the sensitivity level of the 
content in each file. As a result of this task, all 2000 files were classified and verified 
by other subject matter expert to make sure that classification is done correctly and 
consistently.  
We verified the consistency of the classification by distributing different copies of 
the same report over multiple participants and compare their feedback. 
Inconsistency was limited to one report type and was resolved by updating the 
criteria used for classification. Final results were consistent among all sub-groups 
that have been handled by participating subject matter experts.  
Table 6 shows the distribution of files according to their content sensitivity. 




No of Files 
Level 1  615 
Level 2  824 
Level 3  388 
Level 4  173 
Table 6: sensitivity of files in the data set. 
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Most of the files are found to be containing sensitive information (i.e. Sensitivity 
level 2, 3, and 4). Figure 22 shows that files with sensitive content are representing 
the majority of the files in our corpora 
 
Figure 22: Sensitivity levels of files in the corpora. 
The intention of DLP systems is to protect against unauthorized distribution of files 
with sensitive content outside the corporate network. Therefore, our automated 
classifier should work to identify files as confidential or not, further classification 
of files can be completed using different techniques. 
According to this generalized classification, all files in the dataset can be described 
as confidential files or non confidential files. With such classification, confidential 
files will represent approximately 69% of the total number of files in the corpora as 
















Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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Sensitivity Level No of Files 
Files with Sensitive Content (Confidential 
Files) 
1385 
Files without Sensitive Content (Non 
Confidential Files) 
615 
Table 7: Representation of confidential files in the dataset. 
 
This situation resembles the situation in Oil & Gas industry where most of the 
content that is handled by end users is sensitive. Therefore, we believe that collected 
dataset will give a good representation of the real-life situation and would contribute 
to the success validation. Figure 23 shows a comparison between confidential and 
non-confidential files in the corpora.  
 
Figure 23: Representation of confidential files in the corpora. 
Dataset(2): We collected information about files that are reported by a rule-based 
















files with a sensitive content. We reviewed the classification specified by the DLP 
system with subject matter experts. As a result, classification was found to be correct 
in 67 files only. The rest of files were identified inaccurately and do not contain 
sensitive content. In other words, we found that false-positive ratio in files specified 
by the used DLP systems was 86%. Table 8 summaries confidentiality levels of files 
and false-positive ratio in dataset (2).   
Total number of Files 483 
Confidential Content using DLP system in use 483 
Confidential Content as per further analysis 67 
False Positives 416 
False Positives percentage 86% 
Table 8: False Positives using standard DLP. 
 
We will use this dataset in the evaluation of the model in order to measure the 
improvement after implementing our proposed model 
5.3 Data Pre-processing stage 
Data processing includes identifying and preparing your data for the use of the 
classifier.  We intend to use Weka in our text classification. Therefore, we will use 
Weka configuration file that is called the “arrf” file. This file type is used to 
configure selected features and classes so that the tool can recognize them. Arrf file 
has a predefined structure that consists of three sections. Each section starts with @ 
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sign and the section name keyword followed by the configuration value. The first 
section is called the “relation” section. The section starts by @relation <relation-
name>. It is usually used to define and name the relation. The second section is the 
“attribute” section. This section starts by @attribute <feature-name> followed by 
the values that can be assigned to this attribute. We also use this section to define 
our class into either negative or positive values. Generally there are two data types 
for attributes in arrf files: (1) Nominal data types (2) Numeric data types. The last 
section in arrf configuration file is the “data” section. It also starts with @data and 
followed by instances that the classifier will use to learn the classification task. 
Figure 24 shows the preparation of arrf file and its different section.  
 
Figure 24: Preparation of arrf classifier configuration file. 
 
We completed the following tasks to collect data from the research domain and 
prepare it for the classifier:  
1- Identify files to be used in the experiment: 
We collected 2000 files from Oil & Gas business. Collected files are selected 
from files repositories within the following sub-domains: 





Selected files are shared with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assess their 
confidentiality level and label them as “Confidential” or “Public”.  The 
process resulted in identifying and labeling 1385 files as “Sensitive” files and 
“615” files as “Not Sensitive” files.  
2- Identify the instances:  
For each file type, we selected some contents that describe the file. Selected 
content is given the same label as the containing file and considered as the 
instances for training and testing datasets. In some cases, we loaded the 
whole file content as an instance.  
We started by having 200 instances and continued to add more instances to 
improve the representation of the data in the domain and/or improve the 
accuracy of the classification model.  
3- Configure the classification tool:  
We used Weka as a tool to develop and evaluate the text classifier. This tool 
uses configuration file of arff extension to specify classification attributes 
and instance data.  We built the file with attributes definition, class definition, 
and data section. In our configuration, we defined the following attributes: 
(a) Document of type: String, and (b) class of type nominal (i.e. Values = 
Confidential, Public).  
4- Generate the word vector  
We used “StringToWordVector” utility in Weka to generate the matrix of 
features using the defined train file. The tool generated a vector matrix which 
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included all distinct words in the data set and allowed us to specify the 
attribute to be used as the “Class”. We performed the following steps to 
complete this task: 
• Loaded the arff file into Weka 
• Called StringToWordVector filter and identify the attributes 
and the class. We configured the features selection on the 
following way: 
▪ StopwordsHandler: Rainbow  
▪ Stemmer:  IteratedLovinsStemmer 
▪ Tokenizer:  1 (Unigram)  
5- Generate the classifier  
We generated the SVM classifier by selecting SVM algorithm using 
“linsvm” from within Weka and applied it on the arff file using the training 
dataset. 
6- Classifier accuracy: 
We selected content or complete files for testing purposes. Selected content 
was used to generate 600 unlabeled instances in the arff test file.  Then we 
used the saved model to evaluate the performance. 
When we load the test file, we avoided specifying the vector matrix in the 
test file. Otherwise it will not work. Because the number of vectors in the 
train and test file must be equal in names and size. The workaround is to load 
the train file without generating the vector matrix. Instead, we selected the 
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classification and the filter algorithms in one step. The algorithm has the 
ability to handle data that is passed through arbitrary filter so that number of 
vectors will not be considered.  
In “Classify tab”, we chose the “Classifier” and set the filter to 
“StringToWordVector”. Having the tool set this way, it will apply it to Train 
and Test set together, but if we do it separately, then may be un equal attribute 
will result in compatibility issue in Weka. 
Another workaround is to load all data in one vector matrix and perform the 
training and testing on that matrix. This way, we ensure that both datasets are 
of the same number of vectors.  
We evaluated the classifier accuracy by noticing the “Classifier output” 
window and observed the accuracy results. If accuracy result does not satisfy, 
we repeated steps 2 to 6  
In libsvm package, second output parameter of svmpredict() function should 
give the percentage of performance. 
This way, Weka will build a model using the specified Training set and test 
it over test dataset  
When we apply that we will find that we have all as zeros. To know the 
prediction of the model on the test data, we need to activate an option of 
“Output Prediction” in Weka and run the model again. In the “Classifier 
output” window the predictions made by the classifier. For every instance, 
the classifier will predict the value of “?” as either Confidential or Public. 
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We measure the correctness by comparing results to our test file to see what 
predictions are correct and what predictions are wrong. 
Second output parameter of svmpredict() function should give the percentage 
of performance. 
7- Save the model.  
We saved the model for future use 
 
Loading text files content into arff file” 
We used Weka utilty called “TextDirectoryLoader” to load Confidential and Public 
instances into Weka configuration file (i.e. arff file). This utility will perform the 
load from positive and negative examples in a complete automatically fashon. Files 
should be prepared in the repository in a certain way so that the utility can figure 
our positive and negative examples.  
At the end of the automatic load, Weka configuration file will be created and will 




Figure 25: Loading instances from files. 
 
5.4 The classifier Evaluation 
We used Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a linear kernel using Weka toolkit to 
classify files according to their sensitivity level. We used unigram with elimination 
of stop words and limited the total number of feature to 10,000 in order to control 
the dimension of our corpora. If more than 10,000 unique non-stop words are found, 
then we remove noisy/rare features and select the most frequent 10,000 words. We 
used this configuration as our baseline classifier in our experiment. 
We divided files in dataset (1) into training and test datasets. The training data set 
included 500 files while test dataset included the rest (i.e. 1500 files). In our 
prototype we limited the number of nominal values (i.e. classes) to four only. We 
also limited the number of instances to 750. This limitation was imposed for 
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simplicity reasons in the prototype. More classes can be added in the full 
implementation of the model and more instances can be included in the training or 
testing datasets.   
We did not include other taxonomy attributes in our prototype. The configuration 
and implementation of these attributes is identical to the “Sensitivity Classifier” text 
classifier. The inclusion of all attributes will allow for more automation as 
interdependency will improve the ability to identify non-legitimate data 
interchange. 
The accuracy of the classifier is percent of the correct classifications. The error rate 
is the percent of incorrect answers. Thus, accuracy = 1- Error rate.  
5.4.1 Features Selection 
We loaded all features from instances into the vector matrix. Initially, the number 
of features was 1677. We eliminated numeric and some special characters so that 
the number of features became 1511.  
Top 10 attributes were: 
% Attribute 
0.354633       359 Well 
0.343191       924 Cyber 
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0.313643      1043 Session 
0.311612      1056 Symposium 
0.300512       954 Friday 
0.300512      1270 happens 
0.300512      1467 threat 
0.300512      1180 cyber 
0.291873       641 per 
0.291849       471 data 
Table 9: Top attributes for feature selection  
 
Then we tried to evaluate the attributes using “CorrelationAttributeEva” with 
Search function: “Ranker:”  
Top 10 attributes were: 
% Attribute 
0.2981      402 application 
0.2981      358 Course 
0.2981      368 Engineering 
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0.2981      419 guidelines 
0.2105      206 data 
0.2095      416 field 
0.2095      413 distributing 
0.2095      410 death 
0.2095      412 displayed 
0.2095      407 computer-
related 
Table 10: Attributes ranking using CorrelationAttributeEva. 
 
"StringToWordVector" utility & Configuration Parameters 
StringToWordVector is a filter utility in Weka that can be used to convert string 
attributes into a set of attributes representing word occurrence (depending on the 
tokenizer) information from the text contained in the strings. The set of words 
(attributes) is determined by the first batch filtered (typically training data). This 
filter is not strictly unsupervised when a class attribute is set because it creates a 
separate dictionary for each class and then merges them.  
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StringToWordVector can be configured using number of built in Parameters such 
as Stemmer, Tokenizer, StopwordsHandler, IDFTransform, and LowerCaseTokens. 
The complete list of attributes along with their usage is explained on Weka 




We used Stopwords list based on Rainbow 
(http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mccallum/bow/rainbow/) as shown in the list below: 
StopWord StopWord StopWord StopWord StopWord StopWord 
 a       currently       immediate       once       th       who    
able       d       in       one       than      whoever    
about       definitely       inasmuch       ones       thank       whole    
above       described       inc       only       thanks       whom    
according       despite       indeed       onto       thanx       whose    
accordingly       did       indicate       or       that       why    
across       different       indicated       other       thats       will    
   actually       do       indicates       others       the       willing    
   after       does       inner       otherwise       their       wish    
afterwards       doing       insofar       ought       theirs       with    
   again       done       instead       our       them       within    
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   against       down       into       ours       themselves       without    
   all     downwards       inward       ourselves       then       wonder    
   allow       during       is       out       thence       would    
   allows       e       it       outside       there       would    
   almost       each       its       over       thereafter       x    
   alone       edu       itself       overall       thereby       y    
   along       eg       j       own       therefore       yes    
   already       eight       just       p       therein       yet    
   also       either       k     particular       theres       you    
although       else       keep     particularly       thereupon       your    
always       elsewhere       keeps       per       these       yours    
   am       enough       kept       perhaps       they    yourself    
among       entirely       know       placed       think     yourselves    
amongst       especially       knows       please       third       z    
   an       et       known       plus       this       zero    
   and       etc       l       possible       thorough    
 
   another       even       last    presumably       thoroughly    
 
   any       ever       lately       probably       those    
 
anybody       every       later       provides       though    
 
anyhow       everybody       latter       q       three    
 
anyone       everyone       latterly       que       through    
 




   anyway     everywhere       less       qv       thru    
 
   anyways       ex       lest       r       thus    
 
   anywhere       exactly       let       rather       to    
 
   apart       example       like       rd       together    
 
   appear       except       liked       re       too    
 
   
appreciate    
   f       likely       really       took    
 
   
appropriate    
   far       little     reasonably       toward    
 
   are       few       ll    regarding       towards    
 
   around       fifth       look       regardless       tried    
 
   as       first       looking       regards       tries    
 
   aside       five       looks       relatively       truly    
 
   ask       followed       ltd    respectively       try    
 
   asking       following       m       right       trying    
 
   
associated    
   follows       mainly       s       twice    
 
   at       for       many       said       two    
 
   available       former       may       same       u    
 
   away       formerly       maybe       saw       un    
 
   awfully       forth       me       say       under    
 
   b       four       mean       saying    unfortunately    
 




   became       further       merely       second       unlikely    
 
   because    furthermore       might       secondly       until    
 
become       g       more       see       unto    
 
becomes       get       moreover       seeing       up    
 
becoming       gets       most       seem       upon    
 
   been       getting       mostly       seemed       us    
 
   before       given       much       seeming       use    
 
beforehand       gives       must       seems       used    
 
behind       go       my       seen       useful    
 
   being       goes       myself       self       uses    
 
 believe       going       n       selves       using    
 
below       gone       name       sensible       usually    
 
   beside       got       namely       sent       uucp    
 
 besides       gotten       nd       serious       v    
 
   best       greetings       near       seriously       value    
 
   better       h       nearly       seven       various    
 
between       had       necessary       several       ve 
 
beyond       happens       need       shall       very    
 
both       hardly       needs       she       via    
 
 brief       has       neither       should       viz    
 
   but       have       never       since       vs    
 




   c       he       new       so       want    
 
came       hello       next       some       wants    
 
   can       help       nine      somebody       was    
 
   cannot       hence       no       somehow       way    
 
   cant       her       nobody       someone       we    
 
   cause       here       non       
something    
   welcome    
 
   causes       hereafter       none       sometime       well    
 
   certain       hereby       noone       
sometimes    
   went    
 
   certainly       herein       nor       
somewhat    
   were    
 
   changes       hereupon       normally       
somewhere    
   what    
 
   clearly       hers       not       soon       whatever    
 
   co       herself       nothing       sorry       when    
 
   com       hi       novel       specified       whence    
 
   come       him       now       specify       whenever    
 
   comes       himself       nowhere       specifying       where    
 
      o      
consequently    
concerning       still       whereafter    
 
 his       hither       obviously       sub       whereas    
 




   
considering    
   how       off       sup       wherein    
 
   contain       howbeit       often       sure       whereupon    
 
   
containing    
   however       oh       t       wherever    
 
   contains       i       ok       take       whether    
 
If    ie       okay       taken       which    
 
   could     
orresponding    
   old       tell       while    
 
   course       ignored       on       tends       whither    
 
Table 11: Stopwords in Rainbow.   
 
5.4.2 Evaluation 
To complete the evaluation of the classifier, we reviewed the files in our corpora 
and prepared them for the use of the classifier. Selected files are originated from 
different sub-domains in Oil & Gas industry. They included positive and negative 
instances examples. We firstly converted all files and extract text from them. Then 
we selected portions from each extracted text in a way that describes the file content. 
Extracted text was considered as entries in the instance list for the arrf file as shown 
in Figure 24.  
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We then worked to clean the data, meaning that we removed unrecognized 
syntactically rejected characters. We also removed stop words and prepared files 
entries to be used in vector generation as shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Loading cleaned data in arrf classifier configuration file into Weka. 
 
We defined the class that will be used for classification upon loading the file into 
the used tool (i.e. Weka). Identifying the class will enable the classifier to measure 
the distribution, occurrence and weight for every feature. Figure 25 shows the arrf 
file after been loaded into Weka with clear distinction between the attribute and the 
classification class. After that, we generated vectors from selected instances. Total 
number of features was initially 7061 as shown in Figure 26. Later on, the number 
of features increased as a result of adding more instances to the arrf file. Adding 




Figure 27: Generating Vectors for SVM classifier. 
 
The classifier was tested in test data of 1500 files. Initial results did not show high 
accuracy. However, adding more instances to the training list and working with 
the selected features had resulted in high accuracy rate of 97.1% as shown in 
Figure 28 
 







ROC for Algorithm evaluation 
ROC analysis was performed after each configuration change in the following: 
1- Model settings 
2- The instances. 
3- Selected features. 
Below is the snapshot of performed ROC evaluations: 
We picked all attributes to see if the model will perform well. Results was not 
accepted. Snapshot is below: 
 




Figure 30: ROC Analysis (1). 
 
 
Figure 31: ROC Analysis (2). 
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Then we removed all numerical values from attributes. Attribute number changed 
from 1676 to 1511. Same number of instances 296.  
Classifier performance was almost the same: 
 




Figure 33: ROC Analysis (4). 
 
Figure 34: ROC Analysis (4). 
Then we change the StringToWordVector attribute: Stemmer to use 
IteratedLovinsStemmer. This stemmer is an iterated version of the Lovins stemmer. 
It stems the word (in case it's longer than 2 characters) until it no further changes. 
Julie Beth Lovins (1968). Development of a stemming algorithm. Mechanical 
Translation and Computational Linguistics. 11:22-31. 
Classifier Performance: No change 
Then we changed the “Tokenzer” attribute in StringToWordVector in order to see 
the impact of handling two or three words together while converting words to 
vector. Splits a string into an n-gram with min and max grams. 
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We changed the percent split of training/test instances to be 33/66% respectively. 
Results were less accurate: 
 
Figure 35: ROC Analysis (5). 
 




Figure 37: ROC Analysis (7). 
With cross-validation: 10 folds instead of percentage split. Results were also less 
accurate. 
 




Figure 39: Cross Validation (10 folds) - ROC Analysis. 
Model was able to identify 99.6% percent correctly 
 
Figure 40: Model Accuracy. 
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Experiment to evaluate multiple algorithms: 
We used Weka to evaluate multiple algorithms. We selected the configuration file 
(i.e. arff file) and the configured the tool to evaluate NaiveBayes and SVM 
algorithms.  
 
Figure 41: Algorithms Evaluation. 
 
Results of Weka algorithm evaluator showed that SVM algorithm will perform 
better based on supplied arff file and included instances  
5.5 Model Evaluation 
Our objective is to validate that the DLP system will perform better using the text 
classification done by SVM and Domain-specific taxonomy. Thus, we trained and 
90 
 
tested the algorithm using the dataset (1), and then we used it over the Dataset (2) 
to measure the improvement. Accuracy will be calculated based on results generated 
from the Dataset (2). We compared false-positives in both scenarios and concluded 
the results accordingly. 
The environment in which we conducted our experiment has a standard DLP system 
that is used to protect against possible data leakage. The used DLP system is using 
different techniques to detect possible leakage. The most important method used is 
the analysis of content sensitivity based on labels that are added to the files by end 
users using a standard classification/labeling tool. Typically, end-user will perform 
subjective evaluation of the sensitivity level of the content and label the file using 
that tool. Later on, other systems that are used for information protection purposes 
within that environment will refer to this classification in order to decide what 
actions to take place. If the file that is transferring over the network is labeled with 
sensitivity level 2, 3, or 4, DLP system will capture the following information: (a) 
Log of the possible leakage incident (b) Information about the file. 
Collected information will be shared with the business organization which the user 
who initiated the transfer action belongs. That organization then will conduct further 
investigation on the reported incident and take action if necessary. 
We initiated a monitoring window of the standard DLP system findings during a 
period of four months. During this period, DLP system reported 483 files as possible 
leakage incidents. All identified incidents were reported to business organizations 
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for further analysis. Table 9 shows details of reported incidents during the period 
from September 2016 to December 2016.  
 
 
Report Month Reported Incidents Reported files 
Sep 2016 45 141 
Oct 2016 25 62 
Nov 2016  17 45 
Dec 2016 140 235 
Total 227 483 
Table 12: files identified by the current DLP as sensitive files. 
 
We collected information about reported files and found that: (1) All files that were 
reported as leakage incidents have been labeled by end-users as sensitive files. 
Sensitivity level varied from level 2 to level 4. (2) Files types are similar to the 
majority of files used in the domain. In specific, 97% of the files are on one of the 
following: PDF, MS Word, MS PowerPoint, or email messages as shown in Figure 
28. (3) All reported incidents included one or more files that are sent via emails to 




Figure 42: Types of identified files. 
 
We reviewed those 483 files that were identified by the standard DLP system as 
confidential files with subject matter experts. They identified that only 67 files of 
them do contain sensitive content. Thus, the standard DLP system has inaccurately 
identified 416 files as sensitive files. In other words, false-positive ratio was 
approximately 86% as shown in Table 8. 
We used the proposed model with the same set of 483 files. The objective is to find 
out which files will be specified by the proposed model as confidential files. The 
proposed model identified 76 files in the list as confidential files. Summary of the 
identified files using the proposed model is shown in Table 10 
The 76 files that are classified by the model as confidential files include the exact 
list of 67 files that were identified by the subject matter experts as sensitive files. 













msg word ppt pdf other
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Total number of Files 483 
Confidential Content using standard DLP 
system 
483 
Confidential Content as per further analysis 76 
False Positives 9 
False Positives percentage 2% 
 Table 3: False Positives using proposed model. 
 
5.6 Results Discussion 
The proposed model was able to identify same set of files that were identified as 
confidential files by the standard DLP and the subject matter experts. In addition to 
that, the number of files that are inaccurately classified was so much less in 
comparison to the standard DLP system in use. In specific, only 9 files were not 
classified correctly in comparison to 416 files using the standard DLP.  
We are assuming that automatic classification and labeling of the files interchanged 
over the network will directly change the corporate DLP output. Since that DLP 
system uses labels by end users, then correcting these labels will directly correct the 
output and give results similar to the results of the classifier. Therefore, we assume 
that false-positives at DLP output is equal to 2% as well. We were not able to verify 
this assumption at the used DLP system due to some legal considerations. 
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False-positive ratio was decreased from 86% to less that 2% by using our automatic 
classifier.  Table 11 shows the comparison between the classifier results and the 
standard DLP results: 
 Standard DLP Proposed Model 
Total number of Files 483 483 
Confidential Content 483 76 
Confidential Content as per 
further analysis 67 67 
False Positives 416 9 
Table 4: Proposed Model results Vs DLP results. 
 
Figure 29 shows the difference in false-positives between the proposed model and 
the DLP system in use. We notice that two systems are different at classification 
stage and that different is reflected at the false-positive ratio. 
 
























Standard DLP Proposed Model
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Applying the proposed model has resulted in huge reduction in the percentage of 
false-positives: 
 
Figure 44: Reduction of false-positive ratio. 
The results of our proposed model experiment showed that the use of SVM 
with domain-specific taxonomy to classify the content will lead to low false-



















Conclusion and Future Work 
Our research aimed mainly to address the problem related to Data Leakage 
Prevention system within Oil & Gas industry. Namely, we specified the problem of 
high false-positive ratio. We explained that improving DLP system is a necessity to 
all business sectors and at same importance to Oil & Gas industry.  
We performed a literature review to understand the scale and occurrence of the 
problem. We also reviewed the literature to identify the suggestions for improving 
DLP systems by other researchers. We noticed that many researchers have 
suggested DLP solution can improve by focusing on semantics and context rather 
than syntax. Some other researchers suggested that DLP solutions can use Labeling 
methods to have files pre-prepared. We also noticed that rule-based DLPs require 
less time in configuration and implementation but they suffer from high false-
positive ratio in domains where data do not follow predefined syntax. Some 
researchers suggested that analysis-based DLPs, like text classifiers, will provide an 
advantage over rule-based DLPs in domains like Oil & Gas industry.  
We devised a model that blends together these suggestions and adds to them the use 
of automatic text classifier with domain-specific taxonomy in a step to eliminate 
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human factor in the process. Such combination will improve the accuracy of DLP 
systems and reduce the time to implement them in Oil & Gas organizations. 
Our proposed model includes a domain-specific taxonomy that provides 
comprehensive lexicon of the Oil & Gas industry. We also suggested that 
understanding the context in which data interchange activity is identified will help 
the system to decide on the legitimacy of that action. Finally, we proposed that files 
should be analyzed and labeled prior to the stage of been handled by the corporate 
DLP.  
We suggested that proposed model will improve the performance of DLP systems 
and is expected to reduce the number of false-positives. It will also improve 
performance by distributing the processing overhead of subject file over multiple 
stages. We explained that our proposal includes a domain-specific taxonomy that 
will enable the standard categorization scheme for classification. Values in the 
taxonomy will be used by the text classifier to generate meta-data for each file; later 
on the file labeler will use this metadata to tag files. The applied DLP solution will 
use updated file tags and file timestamp to decide on appropriate action. 
We developed a prototype to evaluate the performance of the proposed model. The 
experiment we conducted aimed to find false-positives resulted from standard rule-
based DLP and compare it with false-positives resulted from our prototype.  Our 
experiment logic is explained below: 
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• For a sample Oil & Gas (S), use current standard rule-based DLP system to 
identify false-positive ratio (R1). 
• Develop and prototype model (M) that uses: (a) Domain-specific taxonomy 
(b) Automatic classifier (c) context information.  
• Apply the proposed model prototype (M) on (S) to identify false-positives 
ratio (R2) 
• Calculate improvement (I) = R2 - R1. 
# Standard DLP Proposed Model 




2 Centralized processing for captured 
documents 
Distributed processing  
3 Extended time for configuration 
and  implementation and  
Less time to configure and 
implement 
4 Protect against unintentional data 
leakage incidents 
Protect against unintentional 
incidents and malicious users 
5 Inconsistent and non-standardized   Consistent and standardized 
Table 15: Standard DLP Vs Proposed Model. 
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6.1 Conclusions  
We defined a new taxonomy for information within Oil & Gas. The new taxonomy 
includes information that can be used for different purposes including information 
security. The new taxonomy comprises of attributes that are specific for Oil & Gas 
industry and can be configured to fit uses in different organizations in this domain.  
The defined taxonomy is referencing business functions as defined by the Society 
of Petroleum Engineering (SPE) so that it can reflect changes in this domain and 
continue to be updated all the time. The taxonomy will provide text classification 
with context related information which will enable more reduction in false-positive 
ration and meaningful interpretation of identified data interchange activities.  
We also defined an improved model for DLP by including a pre-step that prepares 
the files for an efficient monitoring by DLP components. Based on the new model, 
the system will bypass the time-consuming discovery part, and the error prone 
human classification. Instead, it will use a classification based on automatic text 
classification using SVM and Information taxonomy that covers all business 
functions in Oil & Gas industry.  
Having these components embedded together in one DLP model will improve the 
reliability of DLP systems in Oil & Gas domain as the model will:  
1- Reduce the false-positive ratio. 
2- Reduce the time for system configuration. 
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3- Reduce the dependency on human factor 
4- Provide domain-specific knowledgebase and context information  
DLP systems are facing three major challenges. These challenges can be 
summarized as follows: 
1- Difficulties in accurately description information to be monitored. 
2- Extended implementation time.  
3- Limitations in handling encrypted and/or graphical information.  
In this research we showed that accuracy in identifying sensitive content in 
documents within Oil & Gas domain can be resolved by devising a model that uses 
automated classification algorithm. The algorithm along with Information 
taxonomy will produce labeled files so that rule-based DLP systems can accurately 
address files with sensitive content.  
In our experiment, we found that false-positive has decreased from 86% to less than 
2% which will enable DLP systems to overcome accuracy challenge 
The second challenge of extended and complicated implementation of DLP solution 
can be resolved by overcoming high false-positives associated with the use of rule-
based DLPs. Rule-based DLPs can be easily configured since they require simple 
configuration. Defining keywords in the taxonomy will enable for two tasks, the 
content classification and the policy-matching. The taxonomy provides the lexicon 
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of Oil & Gas industry. It should require minimum adjustments in order to match the 
Oil & Gas organization that is configuring DLP.  
In addition to that, distributing the task of content inspection and transferred file 
interception over multiple stages in the system operation model will balance the 
processing overhead and adds to the improved performance of DLP systems in 
general.  
Identifying encrypted files and image files remain an open area for researches. 
Currently, a few methods are valid for these type of files. Only hashing and signature 
method can be used to monitor such files. The problem of these methods that users 
can make a minor change in the file will change the hash-function value and in turn, 
the file becomes unidentifiable by DLP solutions.  
6.2 Future work 
The problem of identifying non-classifiable documents is still stands as area for 
future research. Classifier is not able to identify sensitivity of images and files in 
encrypted format.  
Classifying images is one of the most challenging tasks [45]. Currently, there are 
different ways to handle this challenge using classification, Chaitali Dhaware et al. 
[46] surveyed the literature and listed some suggested ways to classify files that 
contains complete this task:   Support Vector Machine (SVM), Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) and Decision Tree (DT).  
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Data Leakage Prevention systems should include the classification modules as a 
genuine component in the system so that system configuration and setup will not 
consume more time and effort. 
Information Taxonomy for Oil & Gas is also open for more researches as the 
taxonomy presented in this research doesn’t clarify interdependencies between 
different business functions in the domain. Knowing these interdependencies will 
help specifying paths in which data-flow is expected. Such information will help 
reduce false-positives and allow for better protection.   
Introducing the domain-specific taxonomy is a valid idea for other industries as 
well. Files in each industry have commonalities that can be collected, analyzed, and 
organized in a structure that supports automatic file classification tasks. Researchers 
should look at industries where the majority of interchanged data is confidential and 
apply the domain-specific taxonomy. Some examples for implementation are health 
sector, banking sector, military, etc. 
Information taxonomies can also be linked directly to the used classifiers in order 
to tune their work and ensure that output accuracy is high. Elements of the taxonomy 
can be assigned different weights and have the classifier directly linked to it. In case 
of feature selection is needed, elements in the taxonomy with low weight will be the 
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